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Activism and the Shift to Annual Director Elections
Re-Jin Guo
University of Illinois – Chicago
Timothy A. Kruse
Xavier University
Tom Nohel
Loyola University – Chicago

We examine a comprehensive sample of 465 firms that switch from staggered boards to annual director
elections between 2003 and 2010. Shareholder activism is an important determinant of the manner of the
switch. When the change is pushed by aggressive hedge fund activists the board is more likely to embrace
annual elections immediately and the markets react favorably, but if the change is pushed by non-binding
shareholder proposals, the response is to drag out the change as much as possible and the markets are
commensurately unimpressed. Moreover, our sample firms are substantially more likely to be acquired in
the ensuing two years when the shift to annual elections is pushed by activist hedge funds.
INTRODUCTION
The staggered board, a structure whereby directors typically have non-synchronous terms of three
years rather than facing annual elections, is arguably the most consequential takeover defense. As such,
staggered boards have drawn the ire of activist shareholders and governance experts alike. The result is a
significant reduction in the incidence of staggered boards: in 2001 roughly 60% of S&P 500 companies
had staggered boards, while that proportion has fallen to well under twenty percent today. Our earlier
study (Guo, Kruse, and Nohel, 2008) found that non-binding shareholder proposals (what Ferri, 2010,
calls “low cost” activism) were an important catalyst in the move away from staggered boards. More
recently, activist hedge funds have emerged as an alternative and better-financed vehicle to channel
shareholder displeasure, and to benefit financially from improvements in the governance environment. In
this paper, we document the extent to which shareholder activism of any type continues to push this
change in governance practice, focusing on the implementation and aftermath of the de-stagger.
Staggered boards, and their takeover defense cousins, poison pills, continue to figure prominently in
the battle for shareholder democracy. According to Georgeson (2012), shareholder proposals to repeal
staggered terms for directors are among the most common and are the most popular with shareholders
reaching 81% support in 2012 (up from a still substantial 62% in 2003). The use of staggered boards and
poison pills in tandem creates a veritable fortress against would-be suitors. For all intents and purposes,
no poison pill meant to deter a hostile takeover has ever been triggered.1 Moreover, since it is the board of
directors rather than the shareholders that control the fate of most poison pills, the ability to influence the
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board is paramount. But gaining control of a staggered board is prohibitively expensive as it requires
winning elections at two separate annual shareholders’ meetings. In fact, no prospective suitor has ever
gained control of a staggered board by voting out incumbent directors.
The difficulty of fighting through a staggered board was recently brought to the fore in the muchwatched and expensive battle between rivals Air Products & Chemicals and Airgas. Air Products had
been in negotiations with Airgas since late 2009, and finally went public with a hostile offer at $60 per
share in February of 2010. Airgas held firm, rejecting this and all subsequent offers, protected by its
staggered board and poison pill combination. The case eventually featured dissident directors pushed by
Air Products, an attempt to alter the timing of Airgas’ annual meeting, and even a court battle that reached
the Delaware Supreme Court. Air Products ultimately abandoned their bid, purportedly dumping a total of
$100+ million in the process. For more details see Section Two, as well as Bebchuk et al. (2013).
Several papers support the notion that staggered boards destroy shareholder value. These include
Bebchuk et al. (2002a,b), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Daines (2005), Faleye (2007), Guo et al. (2008),
and Bebchuk et al. (2013). Faleye (2007), in particular, demonstrates staggered boards are a means of
entrenching managers, allowing them to continue to enjoy considerable autonomy, as well as the many
perks that come with working in the C-suite. Yet, of these studies, only Guo et al. (2008) consider the role
of shareholder activists in advancing this cause, but the focus was entirely on non-binding shareholder
proposals.
Recently, research in the area of corporate governance has shifted increasingly to the role of activist
hedge funds as external monitors. Papers such as Brav et al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2008), Greenwood
and Schor (2009), and most recently Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2013) show that activist hedge funds,
motivated by their large financial stakes in firms often successfully agitate for change at target firms.
These activist hedge fund campaigns typically focus on board membership, disbursement of cash, or
pushing the target to put itself up for sale. Takeover defenses can pose a considerable obstacle, prompting
activist hedge funds to push for removal of the defense(s), or for board membership, giving them a voice
in the ultimate fate of defenses. None of the above papers specifically focuses on the role of activist hedge
funds in pushing for the removal of anti-takeover amendments in general, let alone staggered boards.
The recent case of Chesapeake Energy highlights the role and relative power of different types of
shareholder activists. In 2008 and 2009, gadfly activist Gerald Armstrong made shareholder proposals
calling for the elimination of Chesapeake Energy’s staggered board. In both cases, a majority of
shareholders casting votes supported these shareholder proposals with 86.2% of shares voted supporting
the 2009 proposal. Not only did Chesapeake not relent to shareholders’ wishes, but in 2011 they
convinced the Oklahoma legislature to require all publicly-traded firms incorporated in Oklahoma to have
a staggered board (Gilbert, 2011).
Subsequently, two well-known activists, Carl Icahn and Southeastern Asset Management, launched a
campaign directed at Chesapeake in 2012, motivated by their ownership stakes of 7.56% and 13.6%,
respectively. The campaign culminated in the appointment of five new independent directors and a new
non-executive chairman.2 In January 2013, the newly configured board announced that if the new
mandatory staggered board provision was not overturned by the legislature, the company would
reincorporate in Delaware. On March 5, the governor signed an amendment dropping the staggered term
rule, and Chesapeake announced that the entire board will stand for reelection at the next annual meeting:
they had de-staggered their board, and in the quickest possible way at that (Gilbert, 2013). In this paper,
we show that the manner in which companies respond to requests from shareholders is markedly different
depending on the identity of the shareholder making the request, as illustrated by the situation at
Chesapeake.
The move away from staggered boards in favor of unitary boards (i.e., boards whose directors face
annual elections) is but one of many contemporaneous attempts to empower shareholders.3 Other
significant issues include proxy access, new rules requiring shareholders to have a “say on pay”, reducing
the influence of broker non-votes, and majority voting in director elections. This movement accelerated
following the fallout from the bursting of the internet and telecom bubbles and the ensuing revelations of
corporate fraud that led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late 2002.4
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In terms of shareholder proposals, it wasn’t that proposals to de-stagger the board only began in
earnest in 2003. There were significant numbers of such proposals already in the mid-1990s, and they
even received considerable support (See Georgeson, 1996, 2000, and 2004). Instead, it appears that
finally, beginning in 2003 and continuing thereafter, management started to listen to shareholders and
seek changes to mollify them.5
In this paper, we build on Guo et al. (2008) and compile a sample of instances of firms whose
management has stated an intention to put a resolution to de-stagger the board to a shareholder vote or
simply de-staggered by board vote. We focus on the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (i.e., 2003-2010) and
find 465 separate events. We find that the overall reaction to the decision to de-stagger shows a small but
significant increase in shareholder wealth of 0.4% over the 3-day announcement period centered on the
event date. This is driven by the instances where an activist hedge fund has taken an active role in trying
to reform the target firms’ governance. Subsequent analysis indicates that such firms have a significantly
enhanced probability of being acquired within two years of de-staggering the board.
A comprehensive analysis of the role that external pressure plays in driving this change in governance
reveals that a majority of firms that eventually decide to move to annual director elections face some form
of shareholder pressure, but the nature of the pressure has considerable impact on the response of the
targeted firm and the response in the markets to the announced change. Specifically, there is considerable
variation in the pace of the change in board structure: firms that face pressure in the form of non-binding
shareholder proposals tend to allow directors to serve out existing terms, thereby phasing in the move to
annual director elections over several years, i.e., dragging the process out as much as possible. In contrast,
firms that have been targeted by activist hedge funds tend to de-stagger their boards by the next
shareholders meeting if not immediately (that is, all of the directors agree to resign and face reelection
that very year if the shareholders approve the proposal to de-stagger). Moreover the markets respond in
kind, bidding up the shares of firms targeted by activist hedge funds, seemingly in anticipation of an
eventual takeover, while being unresponsive to a de-staggering prompted by non-binding shareholder
proposals. This is buttressed by our evidence from the M&A market.
Consistent with this interpretation, firms moving to annual director elections under pressure from
activist hedge funds are significantly more likely to be acquired within two years than otherwise
comparable firms, in the spirit of Greenwood and Schor (2009). In contrast, firms moving to annual
director elections under shareholder pressure in the form of non-binding shareholder proposals are no
more likely to be acquired within two years than otherwise similar firms that do not face any pressure.
Interestingly, the association between hedge fund involvement and eventual acquisition largely disappears
during the financial crisis. A likely explanation is that activist hedge funds rely on liquid financial
markets to practice their craft (Norli et al., 2010), but financial market liquidity had been rather impaired
during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the recent crisis.
STAGGERED BOARDS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ACTIVISM, AND FIRM VALUE
Researchers have examined the use of anti-takeover protections for nearly 30 years.6 The earlier
literature is rather inconclusive in many respects with few papers showing significant wealth effects on
the adoption of takeover defenses. Moreover, those that do find significant effects are unable to reach a
consensus on the question of whether defenses are good or bad for shareholders.
These earlier studies focus on the adoption of takeover defenses. However, many defenses were
adopted during the 1980s before the case law in this area had yet to reach a consensus. More recently,
firms tend to go public with takeover defenses already in place. With the recent pushes toward
shareholder empowerment, firms seem reluctant to put the adoption of defenses to a shareholder vote.
One of the primary advantages of our approach is that we focus on the removal rather than the adoption of
takeover defenses. Moreover, with the Delaware case law on the viability of takeover defenses firmly
established by the mid-1990s (see Bebchuk et al. 2002), our focus on the post Sarbanes-Oxley period
means that we are dealing with a fairly stable and well-established legal environment.
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Underlying the lack of consistency in earlier studies of takeover defenses is a theoretical debate over
whether takeover defenses help or hurt shareholders. Opponents argue that defenses are a way for poorly
performing managers to entrench themselves. However, proponents claim defenses enhance stability and
the bargaining position of the incumbent board, leading ultimately to a higher premium on deals that
eventually go through.7
A similar debate has centered on the topic of optimal board structure. Several early studies concluded
that small boards and outsider-dominated boards are optimal (see Yermack, 1996; Weisbach, 1988; and
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), but more recent work has questioned whether such prescriptions should
apply universally, by stressing the advisory role, in addition to the monitoring role, of corporate boards
(see Raheja, 2005; Coles et al., 2008; as well as earlier work by Adams, 2000; Bainbridge, 2002; and
Stout, 2003). A consensus in this literature is certain firm characteristics, as well as the environment
within which the firm operates (including the regulatory and governance environment), might have an
inconsistent impact on the monitoring and advising function of boards. Therefore, an optimum likely
involves a trade-off between better enabling the monitoring function and better enabling the advising
function based on which role is more important for any given firm and in any given environment.8
The literature has established staggered boards as the most important takeover defense.9 It is not a
staggered board in isolation but rather the combination of a staggered board and a poison pill that creates
a near impenetrable defense. But since a board can install a pill at any time without shareholder approval,
the staggered board becomes the key element of this joint defense. If you control the board, the fate of the
poison pill is in your hands. The poison pill is so effective that no pill meant to deter a takeover has ever
been triggered.
Governance experts and shareholder activists have been fighting against staggered boards for some
time. As a result, the number of firms attempting to get shareholder approval to stagger their boards has
declined precipitously since 1990.10 One exception to this trend is that firms going public often adopt a
staggered board prior to their IPO. In fact from 1988 to 1999, the proportion of firms going public with
staggered boards has increased substantially (Field and Karpoff, 2002, Daines and Klausner, 2001,
Coates, 2001). Another exception is that some states have adopted laws meant to shield local firms from
potential hostile offers, as in the case of Oklahoma/Chesapeake discussed earlier.11
Several papers have paid considerable attention to staggered boards (i.e., Bebchuk et al, 2002a, b;
Bechuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2006; Daines, 2005; Faleye, 2007; and John and
Kadyrzhanova, 2009). For example, Faleye (2007) showcases specific ways in which staggered boards
help to entrench management. He shows that firms with classified boards are less likely to fire the CEO
when warranted, reduce the effectiveness of independent directors, are more likely to have officers whose
pay is unresponsive to performance, and are less likely to implement (non-binding) shareholder proposals
when passed, all consistent with an entrenched CEO lacking accountability.12
More recently, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2013) take advantage of two Delaware decisions
regarding director elections to perform a natural experiment examining the value destroying impact of
staggered boards. Following unsuccessful private negotiations, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. launched
a hostile takeover offer for Airgas, Inc. in February 2010. The hostile offer faced the typical difficulty of
gaining timely control of Airgas’ staggered board. As a result, Air Products hit upon the idea to file a
shareholder proposal calling for Airgas to move its annual meeting forward from its typical August date
to January, reducing the time it would take Air Products to wage and (perhaps) win two proxy fights and
thereby gain control of the board. While a majority of the votes cast were in favor of the proposal, it did
not receive the two-thirds approval Airgas claimed was required for passage and the case went to the
Delaware Chancery Court.
While the Chancery Court ruled in favor of Air Products, the Supreme Court overturned the Chancery
Court’s decision in favor of Airgas. Bebchuk et al. (2013) perform an event study of over 3,000 firms on
the two decision dates. Overall, the announcement effect of the Chancery Court decision was significantly
positive and then the effect was reversed on the Supreme Court decision to overturn the original ruling.
The effect was strongest for smaller, more undervalued firms, i.e., those most likely to be takeover
targets. The authors argue that their results help resolve an endogeneity issue surrounding takeover

86

Journal of Accounting and Finance vol. 14(4) 2014

defenses. Specifically, it is more likely that takeover defenses reduce firm value, rather than that loweredvalued firms are more likely to implement takeover defenses. Presumably, the decisions of the Delaware
Courts can be assumed to be exogenous.
Overall, the recent research makes it much harder to make the case that staggered boards are good for
shareholders. Voting and proposal patterns over the last 15 years indicate shareholders increasingly
recognize the detrimental effect of a staggered board. Moreover, institutions such as activist hedge funds
and pension funds and proxy advisory services such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and
Glass-Lewis generally act against staggered boards.
In this study, our main focus is on the implementation of annual director elections and its aftermath,
rather than on the decision to de-stagger the board. We take it as given that staggered boards are on
average value-destroying and focus on the aftermath of the decision to instigate annual director elections,
examining the implementation of annual elections, as well as the exposure of the de-staggering firm to the
market for corporate control.
Shareholder activists have long made the removal of takeover defenses a primary goal. However, the
effectiveness of the activism, frequently pursued via non-binding shareholder proposals, has been mixed
(see Gillan and Starks, 2000 and Ferri, 2010 for surveys). More recently hedge funds have become
common and frequently vocal shareholder activists. These activists have many goals, but often their
ultimate goal is getting their targets acquired. Removing takeover defenses such as staggered boards and
poison pills are seen as an important step to increase shareholder value regardless of the ultimate
independence of the target (see Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2009, for a survey).
Greenwood and Schor (2009) partition their sample by whether the activist target is ultimately
acquired. They report both the short- and long-term abnormal returns are significantly positive only for
the firms that are acquired within 18 months of the initial 13D filing. A firm’s decision to de-stagger its
board increases the likelihood of an eventual acquisition.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES
Our primary sample consists of firms that chose to de-stagger their boards between 2003 and 2010.
We collect data on the elimination of staggered boards from the governance database available from the
IRRC and from Riskmetrics. The sample firms are first identified from firms that change their staggered
board status in the IRRC data and/or a change is reported in a Riskmetrics report. We supplement the
sample by searching the Dow Jones Newswire (Factiva) and Lexis-Nexis with the key words
"declassification," "de- staggering," "declassify," "de-stagger," and "annual election of directors." Our
final sample consists of 465 firms and is relatively evenly distributed over the sample period.
We combine our sample with that of an earlier paper covering 1987 to 2004 (Guo et al., 2008) and
present this longer time series in Figure 1. Overall, 527 companies have announced an intention to destagger their boards over 1987 to 2010, with over 88% of that total having done so since 2003. The
remarkable increase in the number of firms de-staggering their boards is part of a general trend
fo cu sing on sh areho ld er emp owermen t in the wake of scandals such as Enron and Worldcom.
In this paper, we focus our attention on these later de-staggering events (i.e., subsequent to the SarbanesOxley legislation), since this represents a period of stable regulatory environment, and case law in the
area of takeover defenses had been firmly established for several years by then.
We collect information regarding the de-staggering proposals from proxy statements filed with the
SEC in the year of the decision to de-stagger and from press reports for each sample firm. An
important consideration is the speed that the firms de-stagger their board (i.e., what is the first year that
shareholders have the opportunity to elect the entire board for the first time).
The fastest outcome has all directors resigning immediately and allowing shareholders the
opportunity to elect the entire board in the proposal year (year 0). At the other extreme, s o m e firms
drag out the process as long as possible. In this case, the current slate of directors is still elected to a three
year term and all directors serve out their terms. Then beginning with the next year, directors are elected
to new one year terms. As a result, shareholders do not have the opportunity to vote for the entire board

Journal of Accounting and Finance vol. 14(4) 2014

87

until three years after the de-staggering event. Of course, intermediate cases are also possible. As there
are no legal conditions preventing the immediate move to annual elections, any proposed delay is
clearly an indication of reluctance on the part of officers and directors to move to annual elections.
We provide information regarding the relative frequency of each type of implementation in Table 1,
Panel A and the evolution of the relative frequency of each type over the sample period in Figure 2.
There is a clear trend towards dragging out the process, with an increase in the time until shareholders
can elect the entire board of over a year from 2003 to 2010. Sample firms used the longest possible time
frame less than 15% of the time in 2003 and 2004. By 2009 and 2010, this proportion exceeded 60%. A
typical stated reason for the phased-in approach is to smooth the transition to the new method of electing
directors. However, there are few, if any, logistical issues involved in transitioning to annual director
elections, nor are there legal constraints, as stated above. We therefore conclude that these instances
likely represent foot-dragging on the part of directors.
We report ownership figures in Panel B. On average, officers and directors hold 9.1% of their firm’s
shares, while the CEO holds about 3.1% of the equity. Moreover, the CEO is also the board chair at 62%
of the sample firms. It is likely management considers the firm’s governance environment when
determining the manner in which it de-staggers. Therefore, we collect data on institutional shareholders
and find they hold an average of 73% of the shares of our sample firms in the quarter ending before the
announcement. These figures do not suggest anything unusual about our sample firms.
We collect information on concurrent management and shareholder proposals regarding other
takeover defenses in Panel C. Overall, there are other management (shareholder) proposals
contemporaneous with the de-stagger decision at 23.4% (14.3%) of our sample firms. Typical
management proposals include eliminating supermajority voting provisions, allowing shareholders the
right to call a special meeting, and instituting majority voting for directors. In a few cases, management
called for the elimination of cumulative voting for directors. This latter proposal can be seen as an
attempt to minimize the impact of the de-staggering decision. The most common shareholder proposals
call for majority voting in director elections, elimination of supermajority voting provisions, and the
elimination of poison pills.
We report data on the degree of entrenchment of the sample firms, as well as their industry peers,
in Panel D. We use the E-index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) as our entrenchment index.
These data are available for all firms covered by IRRC on Bebchuk’s website.13 We collect
information on the components of the E-index for firms not covered by the IRRC from
Capital IQ and SEC filings. The E-Index is the sum of six dummy variables indicating the presence
of a staggered board, poison pill, whether there exists limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, whether
there is a supermajority requirement for mergers, whether there exist limits to shareholder charter
amendments, and whether there is a golden parachute. Our sample firms typically are well protected
with 3.53 out of 6 defenses (median of 4 defenses), which is significantly greater than their industry peers
at the 1% level (either based on industry means or medians).
We collect information on the incidence of shareholder activism at the de-staggering firms. We use
Riskmetrics and proxy statements to examine the incidence of shareholder proposals calling for annual
elections in the three years up to the announcement. We also examine Schedule 13Ds filed with the
SEC, along with news articles, for evidence of hedge fund activism targeted at the sample firms. The
SEC requires investors acquiring a stake of 5% or greater with an intent to influence management to file a
Schedule 13D within 10 days of crossing the 5% threshold (otherwise they must file 13-G). Note that
while filers of Form 13D are not exclusively activist hedge funds, such funds do represent a substantial
majority of the entities behind such filings and therefore for simplicity we refer to all of these as “activist
hedge funds”.
We focus our attention on Item 4 of the 13D statements which details the plans of the investor.
In many cases, the language is simply boilerplate: the investor states that they bought the shares
because they view them as undervalued and that the shareholder might informally contact the target
management. In other cases, the shareholders take a much more active role including writing letters,
attending board meetings, making shareholder proposals, and even running proxy fights for board seats.
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A frequent outcome of this activism is that the board eventually decides to de-stagger. Our sample firms
are subject to more active attention from large investors than the norm. Brav, Thomas, and Kim
(2009) report 47.9% of all Schedule 13D filings indicate a less aggressive, boilerplate approach.
As can be seen in Panel E, the less aggressive approach occurs in only approximately 27% of our
cases in which a 13D is filed. Overall, nearly 60% of the sample firms are subject to some form(s) of
activism, with over 40% the target of shareholder proposals to de-stagger the board in a n y o f
event years -1 through -3. Over half of the non-binding shareholder proposals come from “gadfly”
shareholders with the remainder coming from institutional investors, unions, and hedge funds.14
We collect a wide array of accounting data for our sample firms. We industry-adjust the figures by
deducting the median figure based on two-digit SIC code. We report these industry-adjusted figures in
Panel F. Overall, our sample firms tend to out-perform their industry peers in terms of both E B I T D A
a n d Net Income to Assets, both significantly greater than their industry peers at the 1% level. The
sample firms are noticeably more levered than their industry peers. The typical target has a market
capitalization of just over $2 billion. We do not see a trend in terms any of the financial variables over
time.
THE SHIFT TO ANNUAL DIRECTOR ELECTIONS AND ITS AFTERMATH
Figure 2 shows that the trend among our sample firms has been to lengthen the time until
shareholders can elect the entire board, with the average number of years until shareholders can elect the
entire board increasing from one to well over two over the sample period. We begin our more detailed
analysis by examining factors affecting this implementation decision. We then analyze the
announcement effects of the decision to de-stagger. Finally we consider outcomes by looking at the
likelihood of acquisition of sample firms in the two years following their decision to de-stagger and the
factors affecting those outcomes. In all of these analyses, our main focus is on the type of activism faced
by firms (if any) and its influence on outcomes.
Analysis of the Implementation Decision
We report various factors associated with the type of implementation in Table 2. We divide the sample by
the year in which shareholders first have the opportunity to elect the entire board and examine firm and
activism characteristics for each group. We also report test statistics comparing firms that allow for the
election of the entire board immediately (in year 0) against those that draw out the process as long as
possible (not until year 3) as well as for a broader comparison of those that allow quicker elections (years
0 and 1) against those that drag out the process (years 2 and 3).
As reported in Table 2, Panel A, non-binding shareholder proposals have a perverse impact on the
speed with which management implements its decision to de-stagger. Among firms that choose to allow
an immediate vote for all directors, shareholder proposals occurred in only 15.6% of cases. In
contrast, shareholder proposals preceded 64.6% of the cases in which the firm decided to drag out the
process through year 3. This is consistent with the idea that management believes it is necessary to
listen to shareholder proposals more than they might have in the past, yet they feel comfortable enough to
drag out the process as long as possible. However, firms who find themselves targeted by activist hedge
funds (those filing Schedule 13D) tend to accelerate the de-staggering process, suggesting an
unwillingness of these more well-financed activists to accept managerial foot-dragging. Specifically,
37.2% of firms choosing to immediately allow the entire board to be elected are pressured by activist
hedge funds, while only 18% of the firms that decide to drag out the process for three years faced pressure
from activist hedge funds.
Next, we examine whether managerial ownership or the presence of other takeover defenses plays a
role in the speed at which the de-staggering decision is implemented. Panel B reports the proportion of
shares held by the CEO and Officers and Directors (O&D) as well as the sample firms’ E-index and
industry adjusted E-index segmented by year in which shareholders can first elect all directors. Firms
with higher CEO or O&D holdings are more likely to allow quicker elections, consistent with the idea
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that higher shareholdings better align officer and general shareholder interests. In contrast, firms that drag
out the process tend to be those with higher firm and industry-adjusted defenses, as well as smaller
O&D/CEO holdings. It is possible these firms are concerned that they are unduly exposing themselves to
unwelcome offers by de-staggering quickly. The fact that CEO and O&D ownership is low suggests that
they have less to gain from de-staggering, while the fact that they have strong defenses in place suggests
that they may fear the accountability and exposure to the market for corporate control that comes with
annual director elections.
Finally, we examine the relative financial performance and firm size of the firms segmented by first
election year and report the results in Panel C. Firms dragging out the process as long as possible had the
best earnings prior to the de-staggering decision. They also tended to be larger in terms of total assets and
market capitalization. However, the latter result is weaker, as a few extremely large firms did decide to
allow immediate elections, thus skewing the means. In contrast, there are few differences in leverage and
market to book ratios among firms choosing different implementation processes. Seemingly their
outperformance and large size embolden them with a sense of having more leeway with investors.
We run regressions of the implementation decision on various independent variables and report the
results in Table 3, focusing on explanatory variables discussed earlier. We perform this analysis with and
without industry dummy variables based on either 2 digit SIC codes or Fama-French industry
classifications. The inclusion of the dummies has no appreciable impact on the results, so we report
results without industry dummies in the interest of saving space. The dependent variable (DELAY) is
the number of years until the full board must face annual elections (with values from 0-3). Since the
dependent variable is discreet, with only four possible values, we use ordinal logistic regression,
which allows for the use of ordered dependent variables. Specifically we examine DELAY as in
Equation (1) below:
DELAYi = xiβactivism + yiβcontrols + ziβcrisis + εi

(1)

Where the activism independent variables are a series of dummies indicating whether firm i was
targeted by large shareholders filing a Schedule 13D, who indicated either the intention of taking
specific actions (Active Investor) or a more passive approach (Investment Only 13D) and by firms
receiving Shareholder Proposals. The control variables consist of CEO and institutional ownership,
adjusted and unadjusted E-indexes, and industry adjusted performance. Finally, the Crisis dummy
indicates the firm began the de-staggering process in 2008 or later.
Consistent with the results of Table 2, companies subject to notification of a 13D filing,
particularly those by more active investors, choose to allow the election of all directors more
quickly, by about half a year on average (significant at the 5% level). In contrast, firms tend to drag
out the de-staggering process as long as possible in response to shareholder proposals, by almost one
and a half years (significant at the 1% level).
As with Table 2, firms with a high degree of takeover protection and superior performance want to
maintain their staggered board as long as they can. Also, consistent with the results presented in Figure
2, there is a trend towards delaying the de-staggering in later years, particularly after the financial
crisis began in late 2007. Specifically, firms dragged out the process for about one and a half extra
years, even after controlling for the impact of shareholder pressure, and firm governance and
performance. This is consistent with the notion that market conditions during and immediately after
the financial crisis, especially the reduced liquidity, made activist investing a tougher proposition
and hampered the market for corporate control overall.
We consider the possibility that monitoring costs or advising needs of sample firms affect the
implementation of the move to annual director elections. In regressions not reported in the table,
there is a weak positive relation between advising needs and the length of time to implement the
shift to annual director elections, but the relation is not significant at conventional levels, while the
length of the implementation period is unrelated to monitoring costs. Finally, CEO ownership and
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institutional ownership mostly have no significant relation with the implementation of the destagger.
Wealth Effects
We perform a standard event study of the announcement effects of the move to annual director
elections. We calculate 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the earliest of three possible
dates: (1) the date the intention to put the staggered board to a shareholder vote was announced or
simply the date the board announced its move to annual director elections (if no shareholder vote is
necessary), (2) the date the firm released its preliminary proxy statement including the de-stagger vote
with the SEC, or (3) the filing date of the definitive proxy statement with the de-stagger vote. Not all
firms have press announcements or preliminary proxy statements, implying that the dates are not
necessarily precise, and also implying that the reported CARs most likely understate the impact of the
move to annual director elections on shareholder wealth.
We report the CARs for our de-staggering events in Table 4a. For the entire sample, the CARs
are small but significant at the 5% level, with the mean and median announcement effects of 0.424% (p
= 0.034) and 0.195% (p = 0.045), respectively. We also examine the announcement effects for firms
subject to the various forms of shareholder activism. Perhaps the most interesting result is when we
divide the sample by whether activist hedge funds targeted the firms prior to their decision to destagger. In this case, the mean and median CAR’s are 1.374% and 0.832%, respectively, both significant
at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with Greenwood and Schor (2009), who provide evidence that
hedge fund shareholder activism creates the most shareholder value when the target firms are eventually
acquired. They also report that activism sometimes has unintended consequences. Namely the target
firm is ultimately acquired in 15.7% of the incidences in which the initial goal of the activism was
governance improvements. If we include all firms subject to prior 13D filings (including those with no
stated intention to engage management in discussion about policy changes), the median announcement
effects are smaller at 0.6% but still significant at the 5% level. In contrast, firms subject to shareholder
proposals prior to the de-staggering decision experience insignificant CARs, as do firms that were not
subjected to any form of shareholder activism. Finally, firms that choose to de-stagger quickly (either
immediately or within a year) have median CARs of 0.366%, significant at the 10% level, while those
choosing to delay have insignificant negative CARs.
We regress the CARs on a dummy variable indicating the incidence of hedge fund activism and a
variety of financial and governance measures and report the results in Table 4b. Based on the results of
Table 3, we include the Crisis dummy equaling one if the announcement year is 2008 or later and zero
otherwise. Overall, the results are consistent with the univariate analysis: CARs are significantly higher
(at the 5% level) if the firm was targeted by activist hedge funds (filing a form 13D prior to the decision
to de-stagger). However, consistent with the general decline in M&A activity following the financial
crisis, the crisis dummy is negatively related to the CARs, though not at traditional levels of statistical
significance. The CARs are also positively related to the level of institutional ownership at the 5% level,
consistent with the presence of these investors providing critical liquidity and support for potential
activists, and CARs are positively related to inside ownership, but the significance is weak. We also
estimated specifications that include financial variables on the right hand side, but the financial variables
have no explanatory power for the CARs, so these results have been omitted in the interest of brevity.
Subsequent Acquisition Activity
We examine the acquisition activity of our sample firms following the decision to de-stagger.
Specifically, we track all sample firms for two years subsequent to the de-stagger announcement, to see
which, if any become targets in a takeover. We create a dummy variable, ACQUIRED, which equals one
if the sample firm was acquired within two years of the annual meeting in which shareholders voted to
eliminate the staggered board or announcement date if there was no shareholder vote, and zero
otherwise.15 Overall, 11.2% of the sample firms were acquired within two years. Next we examine the
extent to which different forms of activism act as catalysts for an eventual acquisition.
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We estimate a Logit model, regressing the variable ACQUIRED on the various forms of activism and
an interaction term using the Crisis dummy and report the results in Table 5. Consistent with the
announcement effects reported in the previous section and with Greenwood and Schor (2009), firms are
more likely to be acquired if they were previously targeted by a hedge fund activist. That is, the firms
were being put in play. This effect is both statistically and economically significant, with the implied
probability of acquisition within two years of the decision to de-stagger rising from 8% or 10% to over
20% if targeted by an activist hedge fund, significant at the 1% or 5% level, depending on the
specification. However, the impact of hedge fund activism is reduced in the aftermath of the financial
crisis when equity and credit markets were strained, making it more difficult for hedge fund activists to
succeed in their efforts to get the target acquired (or acquire it themselves). Again these effects are both
statistically and economically significant, with the initial effect essentially obliterated in the crisis period.
In contrast to the impact of activist hedge funds, shareholder proposals have little influence on
subsequent activism activity, and if anything make acquisition within the two-year window less likely
(though not in a statistically significant way). This is consistent with the analysis of the implementation
decision where target managers are minimally acceding to the wishes of this less intense and less wellfunded form of activism.
Summary of the Empirics
Overall, our empirical results show that the trend of 2003 and 2004 documented in Guo et al. (2008)
of acquiescence to shareholder wishes has continued through 2010 (and in fact has continued beyond
2010), though our analysis identifies a new trend: acceding to shareholder wishes on the surface, while
dragging out the change as much as possible. This recent trend towards subtle resistance to change (or,
more bluntly, foot-dragging) is clear and strong. Another novel finding is the role of activist hedge funds
in pushing through improvements in corporate governance and the ability to monitor management, as well
as countering the resistance to change.
As a general rule, though not completely ignored as was the case in years prior to SARBOX, nonbinding shareholder proposals are likely to be met with superficial acceptance combined with
managerial/directorial foot-dragging. In contrast, our sample firms are much less able to ignore the
pressure mounted by hedge funds and other large investors. In fact we know of anecdotal instances where
managerial foot-dragging in response to pressure from hedge fund activists was met with harsh calls to
drop the foot-dragging (see Svaldi, 2004, for an example). These different forms of shareholder pressure
have differing consequences and, ultimately, outcomes. Specifically, firms targeted by activist hedge
funds are acquired within two years with considerably higher frequency (acquisition probability more
than doubles), while firms targeted with non-binding shareholder proposals are not. These outcomes are
anticipated in general by the equity markets although investors are not able to identify specific targets
(i.e., CARs are large and significant when activist hedge funds are involved, but they are not predictive of
eventual acquisitions).
The ultimate influence of these different forms of activism (non-binding shareholder proposals versus
hedge fund activism) likely boils down to who has more skin in the game, and as a result, who has
management’s attention. After all, non-binding shareholder proposals may be filed by any investor who
holds a certain trivial number of shares (as is the case with gadflies), while 13D filers by definition hold at
least 5% of the outstanding equity. Moreover, we should keep in mind that the firms that still had
staggered boards in 2009 and 2010 are likely to be the firms most reluctant to drop their staggered boards.
For instance, by 2013, only a relative handful of S&P500 companies retain staggered boards. But the few
that do are likely to require extreme pressure to change since thus far they have been unwilling to expose
their directors to annual elections.
CONCLUSION
We study firms who have eliminated their staggered boards in favor of annual director elections. We
focus on the 2003 to 2010 period following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, which is characterized by a
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seemingly increased willingness on the part of companies to listen to shareholder activists. Our focus is
on the role that different forms of shareholder activism play in the speed of implementation of the switch
to annual director elections, the response of the market to this implementation decision, and the ultimate
possibility of acquisition.
We build on an earlier study of Guo et al. (2008) that looked at firms choosing to eliminate staggered
boards between 1988 and 2004, since this earlier study pre-dated the most influential period for hedge
fund activism. In extending the sample through 2010, we find that the elevated level of de-staggering
activity in 2003 and 2004 identified in Guo et al. continued at least through 2010. However, concurrent
with this continued elevated level of de-staggering activity, we identify a new trend of companies
increasingly dragging out the implementation of annual director elections for up to three years.
As in Guo et al. (2008) we find that non-binding shareholder proposals have substantial influence on
target firms since we find that close to 40% of all decisions to de-stagger the board are preceded by
shareholder pressure in the form of non-binding proposals. However, when we consider the speed of
eventually moving to annual director elections, it is clear that shareholder interests are not of paramount
importance since the tendency in these instances is to drag out the conversion to annual director elections
for as long as possible. In contrast, events preceded by interest/prodding from activist hedge funds tend to
lead to an immediate switch to annual elections. These two extremes of the activism spectrum also have
differential impacts on shareholder wealth and probability of acquisition.
In terms of wealth effects, overall we see that the market responds favorably to a switch to annual
director elections (significant at the 5% level). But this overall average masks a more striking result: the
response to a de-stagger announcement that was preceded by an aggressive 13D filing from an activist
hedge fund prompts a highly significant jump in share prices of around 1.4%, while a de-stagger
announcement prodded by a shareholder proposal shows no significant reaction.
Finally, we consider the ultimate fate of our sample firms, namely, whether or not they are acquired
within two years of their decision to de-stagger the board. Consistent with our other results, we find that
sample firms subjected to hedge fund activism are substantially more likely to be acquired within two
years of moving to annual director elections, while if anything non-binding shareholder proposals reduce
the likelihood of being acquired, though not significantly. Though the wealth effects and eventual
outcomes both showcase the important role played by activist hedge funds, the market reaction to destagger announcements is not predictive of actual takeover targets.
Overall, our results paint a striking picture of the relative effectiveness of different forms of
shareholder activism. Though officers and directors seem reluctant to outright ignore the views of diffuse
outside shareholders, as had they had been doing throughout the 1990s, their acquiescence appears
superficial, often dragging out the process for several years. In contrast, hedge fund activists refuse to be
ignored. These outcomes are perhaps not surprising considering the hedge funds influencing our sample
firms necessarily had a stake in the target of at least 5%, while non-binding proposals can be submitted by
any investor meeting a trivial ownership threshold.
ENDNOTES
1.

2.

3.
4.

The lone exception is the case of Versata v. Selectica, in which Versata intentionally triggered the
activation of Selectica’s pill and then challenged its validity in court. However, Selectica’s pill was an NOL
pill with a 4.99% trigger, meant to deter transactions that would result in the limiting of Selectica’s ability
to make use of their sizeable amount of NOL carry-forwards. These NOL-based pills are not particularly
meant to deter possible suitors interested in acquiring the adoptees of the pills.
Icahn was permitted to nominate one director, while Southeast was entitled to nominate three. Interestingly,
several slots on the board became available after some existing directors failed to garner a majority of votes
cast in the election. See the Company press release, June 21, 2012.
Of course, the empowerment of shareholders comes at the expense of CEO/managerial power, consistent
with the Kahan and Rock (2010) notion of embattled CEOs.
See Ferri (2010) for a survey of the literature examining some of these issues. Moreover, Guo, Kruse and
Nohel. (2008) document a remarkable acceleration in the trend towards unitary boards in 2003 and 2004.
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5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

A particularly egregious example is the case of Bristol-Myers Squibb. After adapting a classified board in
1984, they received shareholder proposals to repeal the classified board each year from 1985-2003, the last
several years proposals each garnered majority support. Finally, in 2003, they announced that it was
important to adhere to shareholder preferences and de-stagger the board.
See, for instance, DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Linn and McConnell (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987),
Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), McWilliams (1990), Bhagat and Jeffries
(1991), Comment and Schwert (1995), Mahoney et al. (1996), and McWilliams and Sen (1997) who all
look at the wealth effects stemming from the adoption of takeover defenses by firms. None of these studies
has significant coverage of the 1990s or later in their datasets.
Though limited in scope, Bebchuk et al. (2002a,b) raises serious questions about the ability of staggered
boards to increase premia in either negotiated or hostile transactions. More recently, Bates et al. (2008)
counter that staggered boards do increase bargaining power.
A recent paper by Ahn and Shrestha (2012) applies these ideas to the topic of staggered boards, with the
idea that staggered boards are bad when the monitoring function appears more crucial than the advising
function, but might improve the efficacy of outside directors in their role as advisors. They find evidence
supporting these ideas: in cases where the board’s role as advisors dominates, the efficacy of independent
directors is enhanced when their terms are staggered. In contrast, when the need for the board to act as a
monitor dominates, staggered boards lead to inferior outcomes, consistent with entrenchment. We construct
proxies for monitoring costs and advising needs based on the same measures as Ahn and Shrestha (2012),
but we find little evidence that these variables are significant determinants of either the implementation
decision or the eventual independence of the target.
See, for example, Bebchuk et al. (2002a, b), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008).
According to Klausner (2002), of the 10 proposals to introduce staggered boards made in 2000, 6 were
made by firms where insider holdings exceeded 35% of outstanding shares. Of the remaining 4 only 1
passed.
Recently both Oklahoma and Indiana adopted laws mandating staggered boards for companies chartered in
their states. In general these laws were implemented with considerable corporate pressure. See “Oklahoma
Board Rule Benefits Chesapeake,” by Daniel Gilbert, Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2011. Earlier,
Massachusetts famously passed a 1990 classified board law, attempting to shield a local firm from foreign
suitors (see Daines, 2005).
John and Kadyrzhanova (2009) explore the idea that would be acquirers look for the easy targets – that is,
firms with fewer defenses relative to their industry peers. They find that among industries characterized by
a higher incidence of classified boards (what they call the dictator portfolio), the relation between a specific
firm having a classified board and the probability of (1) a bid and (2) conditional on a bid, successful
acquisition, is negatively related to whether it has a classified board. However, the relation does not hold
among firms in their democracy portfolio (i.e., industries characterized by the lowest incidence of classified
boards).
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml
Note that the various forms of shareholder activism are not mutually exclusive. For instance, the same firm
may be targeted by a non-binding shareholder proposal, while simultaneously being targeted by an activist
hedge fund with a stake large enough to necessitate a 13D filing.
Though a 2-year window is an ad-hoc choice, it represents a reasonable compromise between a short
window and a lengthy window. Given that there are a significant number of events in 2009 and 2010, a
longer window treats these events differently from the rest of the sample. Note: our two-year window is
similar to the 18-month window used on Greenwood and Schor (2009).
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FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS BY YEAR OF THE DECISION TO DE-STAGGER
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FIGURE 2
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DE-STAGGERING PROCESS
This figure shows the relative frequency of the time (relative to announcement year) until shareholders
can vote for entire board in a single election. Year 0 indicates the entire board will resign upon the vote to
de-stagger and will stand for reelection immediately. Year 1 indicates the new term for the current class
of directors is one year and the remaining directors also will stand for reelection in the following year.
Year 2 indicates the new term for the current class of directors is one year, but remaining directors will be
allowed to serve their three year terms. Year 3 indicates the current class of directors will receive a three
year term and the remaining directors also will be allowed to serve out their three year terms, switching to
annual elections as the terms expire.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
The sample is 465 firms announcing they will de-stagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder
vote. Panel A reports the implementation process of the decision to de-stagger in terms of the first year (relative to
the announcement) in which shareholders gain the right to vote for all board members at the same annual meeting.
Panel B reports board and ownership information. Ownership figures are the proportion of shares held by the CEO,
officers and directors, and institutional investors. Panel C reports the frequency that other matters are put to a
shareholder vote at the same time as the de-stagger decision, whether proposed by management or shareholders.
Panel D provides information on the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2009). The E-index is the
sum of six dummy variables indicating whether the sample firm has a staggered board, a poison pill, requires
supermajority approval of any merger, has a golden parachute, has limits to amend its charter, and has limits to
amend its bylaws. The adjusted E-index adjusts the sample firm E-index using either the industry mean or median
based on 2-digit SIC codes. Panel E reports the frequency that the sample firms were targeted by a shareholder
proposal, an activist shareholder, or through a Schedule 13D filing simply indicating the possibility of future
activism. Panel F reports various financial data for the sample firms. Industry adjustments use median figures based
on 2-digit SIC codes.

Variable

Mean

Median

Panel A: First year shareholders can vote for the entire board at once
Year 0
0.169
Year 1
0.318
Year 2
0.165
Year 3
0.348
Panel B: Ownership Characteristics:
CEO share ownership
0.031
0.008
Officer & Director share ownership
0.091
0.037
CEO also holds chair position
0.620
Institutional investor share ownership
0.733
0.791
Panel C: Other proxy proposals during de-stagger year
Management proposals
0.234
Shareholder proposals
0.143
Panel D: Anti-takeover devices:
E-index
3.53
4.00
Adjusted E-index (using industry mean) 0.53***
0.49***
Adjusted E-index (using industry median) 0.48***
0.00
Panel E: Monitoring:
Shareholder proposal
0.421
Activist target
0.261
Investment based 13D filing
0.097
Any of above
0.599
Panel F: Industry adjusted financial measures (except size measures which are in $ billions)
EBITDA/Assets
0.028***
0.011***
Net Income/Assets
0.001
0.005***
Profit margin
-0.142
0.012***
Long-term debt ratio
0.078***
0.048***
Total debt ratio
0.047***
0.012***
Market to book
0.103***
-0.015
Total assets
23.388
3.551
Market capitalization
10.288
2.157
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TABLE 2
FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION DECISION
Panel A reports the frequency that the sample firms were targeted by various shareholder activists based
on the implementation of the de-staggering process. The test statistic is the result of a chi-squared test of
the null hypothesis that implementation process is the same regardless of shareholder activism. Panels B
and C report data on ownership, the entrenchment index, and financial data based on the implementation
decision. The mean figure is reported above the median in each instance. The sample comprises 465 firms
announcing they will de-stagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder vote. The test
statistics examine the hypotheses that the means and medians are the same regardless of the
implementation decision. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Year of first opportunity
to elect entire board
Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3
Panel A: activism
Shareholder proposal
Activist event
Boilerplate 13D filing
Any 13D filing
Panel B: ownership and defenses
Proportion CEO ownership
Proportion O&D ownership
Proportion Institutional Investors
Firm E-index
Adjusted E-index

Panel C: financial data
Adjusted EBITDA to TA
Adjusted NI to TA
Adjusted Leverage
Adjusted Market to book
Total assets
Market capitalization

year 0 v 3

yrs 0/1 v 2/3

50.08***
4.46**
3.45*
10.50***

51.06***
1.89
2.15
5.02**

0.016
0.006
0.056
0.026
0.820
0.833
3.938
4.000
0.624***
1.000***

2.87***
3.20***
4.08***
4.91***
5.01***
4.50***
5.28***
4.79***
2.20**
2.16**

2.60***
2.09**
3.44***
3.80***
4.88***
4.12***
4.41***
4.20***
1.87*
2.10**

0.057***
0.018***
0.031***
0.011***
0.086***
0.067***
0.050
-0.031
21.625
5.974
11.010
3.852

2.97***
3.23***
2.74***
2.45**
0.25
1.43
1.19
0.33
0.02
5.42***
1.22
4.64***

2.71***
2.41**
2.37**
1.65*
1.56
2.36**
0.25
0.48
0.66
3.64***
0.13
3.32***

0.156
0.231
0.143
0.372

0.301
0.170
0.102
0.272

0.438
0.184
0.092
0.289

0.646
0.124
0.068
0.180

0.067
0.010
0.154
0.072
0.582
0.635
2.913
3.000
0.233
0.000

0.029
0.007
0.095
0.040
0.705
0.749
3.365
3.000
0.425***
0.000

0.032
0.008
0.097
0.047
0.755
0.795
3.446
3.000
0.500***
0.000

0.019 0.021
0.010*** 0.009*
-0.011 -0.013
0.003* 0.000
0.056*** 0.094***
0.028*** 0.066***
0.056 0.163*
-0.013 0.000
26.534 14.150
3.940 2.911
11.785 8.013
1.575 1.470

-0.015
-0.011
-0.027
0.001
0.080***
0.020***
0.195*
0.027
21.378
1.350
7.594
0.771

Test statistic
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TABLE 3
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF IMPLEMENTATION DECISION
The dependent variable is the number of years until the shareholders have the ability to vote for the entire
board of directors in the same election. Active investor, Investment only 13D, any 13D filing, and
shareholder proposal are dummy variables equaling one if the sample firm was the target of a shareholder
activist. CEO shares and institutional ownership are the proportion of shares held by the CEO and
institutional investors, respectively. E-index is the sum of six dummy variables indicating the sample firm
has a staggered board, a poison pill, requires supermajority approval of any merger, has a golden
parachute, has limits to amend its charter, and has limits to amend its bylaws. The adjusted E-index
adjusts the sample firm E-index using the industry median based on 2-digit SIC codes. The adjusted ROA
is the industry-adjusted net income to total assets based on 2-digit SIC codes. Crisis is a dummy variable
equaling one if the announcement to de-stagger was made in 2008 through 2010.The sample comprises
465 firms announcing they will de-stagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder
vote. Chi-squared statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
(1)

(2)

Active investor

Investment only 13D

Any 13D filing

(3)
-0.575**
(5.16)

(4)
-0.564**
(4.98)

-0.269
(0.65)

-0.266
(0.63)

-0.461**
(4.50)

-0.453**
(4.36)

1.347***
(43.24)

1.339***
(43.04)

CEO shares

-2.230*
(3.51)

-2.105*
(3.10)

-1.790
(2.28)

-1.651
(1.92)

Institutional Ownership

0.426
(1.50)

0.387
(1.22)

0.424
(1.47)

0.384
(1.19)

Shareholder proposal

Firm E-index

1.393***
(45.22)

0.157**
(4.23)

1.385***
(45.00)

0.164**
(4.58)

Adjusted E-index

0.131*
(2.73)

Adj ROA

1.362**
(4.17)

1.406**
(4.47)

1.381**
(4.30)

1.428**
(4.62)

CRISIS

1.497***
(48.92)

1.380***
(39.75)

1.517***
(49.20)

1.393***
(39.86)

Likelihood chi-square
N

143.39***
424

145.08***
425

144.31***
423

146.11***
424
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0.135*
(2.91)

TABLE 4A
THREE DAY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table reports three day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) at the
announcement of the decision to de-stagger the board or put the matter to a
shareholder vote. The sample comprises 455 firms announcing they will destagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder vote. The top
portion of the table segments the sample by whether the sample firms were
targeted by large shareholder activists or received shareholder proposals to destagger the board prior to the de-staggering decision. The bottom portion
segments the sample by the implementation decision. Immediate equals one
indicates the shareholders were able to elect the entire board within one year,
while immediate equals zero indicates the sample firm phased in the
implementation process and shareholders had to wait at least two years before
they could vote for the entire board in one election. The sample comprises 465
firms announcing they will de-stagger their board or that they will put the matter
to a shareholder vote. Test statistics (in parentheses) report examine the null
hypothesis the CARs are equal to zero. *, **, *** indicates significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Mean
Median

Mean
Median

ACTIVE=1
ACTIVE=0
SPROP=1
SPROP=0
0.01374***
0.00247
0.00427
0.00353
(3.20)
(0.45)
(0.87)
(0.81)
0.00832***
0.00129
0.001393
0.00173
(2.83)
(0.35)
(0.76)
(0.71)
Immediate=1
Immediate=0
Full Sample
0.00479*
0.00366
0.00424**
(1.81)
(1.05)
(2.37)
0.0366*
-0.0144
0.00195**
(1.77)
(-1.20)
(2.12)
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TABLE 4B
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION OF THREE DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table presents results of regressions of the three day abnormal return at
announcement of the decision to de-stagger the board or put the matter to a shareholder
vote. Active investor is a dummy variables equaling one if the sample firm was the target
of a large shareholder activist. Crisis is a dummy variable equaling one if the
announcement to de-stagger was made in 2008 through 2010. Institutional ownership and
O&D ownership are the proportion of shares held by the institutional investors and
officers & directors, respectively. The sample comprises 465 firms announcing they will
de-stagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder vote. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.

Intercept

(1)
0.00388
(1.46)

Active investor

0.01159**
(2.03)

Crisis

Institutional Ownership

-0.00444
(-1.01)

(2)
-0.00629
(-1.08)
0.01347**
(2.33)
-0.00732
(-1.60)

0.01501**
(2.01)
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0.1148**
(2.01)
-0.0039
(-0.87)

0.01213
(0.81)
0.0121
0.0072
2.47*
405
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(4)
-0.01253*
(-1.81)
0.01332**
(2.31)
-0.00698
(-1.57)

0.02014**
(2.50)

O&D Ownership
R2
Adj-R2
F-statistic
N

(3)
-0.00265
(-0.87)

0.025
0.018
3.40**
405

0.0137
0.0063
1.86
405

0.02692*
(1.65)
0.0316
0.0219
3.24**
405

TABLE 5
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF ACQUISITIONS OF SAMPLE FIRMS
The dependent variable equals one if the sample firm was acquired within two
years of the annual meeting in which shareholders voted to eliminate the
staggered board or of announcement date if there was no shareholder vote.
Active investor, Any 13D filing, and shareholder proposal are dummy variables
equaling one if the sample firm was the target of a shareholder activist. Crisis is a
dummy variable equaling one if the announcement to de-stagger was made in
2008 through 2010. The sample comprises 465 firms announcing they will destagger their board or that they will put the matter to a shareholder vote. P-values
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.

Intercept

(1)
-2.1633***
(0.0001)

Active investor

0.9397**
(0.0178)

Active investor*crisis

-1.5172*
(0.0622)

(2)
-2.3482***
(0.0001)

Any 13D filing

1.0544***
(0.0016)

Any 13D filing*crisis

-0.7076
(0.1978)

(3)
-1.9545***
(0.0001)

Shareholder proposal

-0.2334
(0.5130)

Shareholder proposal*crisis

-0.2398
(0.6469)

Pseudo R2
N

0.018
465

0.028
465

0.004
465
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